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Abstract: Artificial Morality is a new, emerging interdisciplinary field that centres 
around the idea of creating artificial moral agents, or AMAs, by implementing moral 
competence in artificial systems. AMAs are ought to be autonomous agents capable of 
socially correct judgements and ethically functional behaviour. This request for moral 
machines comes from the changes in everyday practice, where artificial systems are being 
frequently used in a variety of situations from home help and elderly care purposes to 
banking and court algorithms. It is therefore important to create reliable and responsible 
machines based on the same ethical principles that society demands from people. New 
challenges in creating such agents appear. There are philosophical questions about a 
machine’s potential to be an agent, or moral agent, in the first place. Then comes the 
problem of social acceptance of such machines, regardless of their theoretic agency 
status. As a result of efforts to resolve this problem, there are insinuations of needed 
additional psychological (emotional and cognitive) competence in cold moral machines. 
What makes this endeavour of developing AMAs even harder is the complexity of the 
technical, engineering aspect of their creation. Implementation approaches such as top-
down, bottom-up and hybrid approach aim to find the best way of developing fully 
moral agents, but they encounter their own problems throughout this effort.
Keywords: Artificial morality, artificial moral agents, machine learning, moral 
psychology, hybrid model
1. Introduction
Artificial Morality is a new interdisciplinary field of research within 
Moral psychology and Machine engineering (i.e. Robotics). In the last decade, 
due to technological advances, it has been developing at an exponential rate.1 
1 The work on this paper has been supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia through the project Dynamic 
Systems in Nature and Society: Philosophical and Empirical Aspects (No. 179041).
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Synonymously called Machine Ethics, Artificial Morality aims to create self-
governing, ethical machines that can “function in an ethically responsible 
manner”, that is, machines capable of making autonomous decisions that are 
in accordance with the society’s norms and moral standards (Anderson & 
Anderson, 2007, pp 15; Allen, Smith & Wallach, 2005, pp 149). To enable 
morally functioning machines, Artificial Morality considers different 
ethical principles or learning procedures that govern human behaviour and 
enable them to act as moral agents. These governing principles are then 
algorithmically formalized and implemented in machines, thus creating new 
artificial moral agents. (Anderson & Anderson, 2007, pp 15; Misselhorn, 
2018, pp 161).
Artificial Morality can be classified into the subfields of both computer 
science (more closely, artificial intelligence) and moral psychology (or moral 
philosophy), predominately because of its eclectic, interdisciplinary approach 
(Yampolskiy, 2013, pp 389). As a starting point in creating morally competent 
agents, it uses the achievements of cognitive science and ethics. The main 
task, when establishing the basic functioning principles of machines, is the 
abstraction of elements of human moral reasoning and behaviour (Malle, 
2015, pp 243) or formalization of ethical principles into computer algorithms 
(Yampolskiy, 2013, pp 389).
This paper will try to exhibit the complex structure of the Artificial 
Morality field by dividing it into three main parts (or problems).2 The first 
one is the conceptual problem of machines as moral agents, more closely, 
the mere possibility of machines being moral agents equivalent to humans. 
This problem is a philosophical one. It grips the normative nature of the field 
– modality of moral machines – best conceptualized in the question “can 
machines be moral agents?”. Answering this question requires considering 
the components of moral agency and realizable ways in which machine 
behaviour can come close to human behaviour.
The second part considers the descriptive, psychological problem 
that comes after resolving the previous one, namely, the problem of social 
acceptance of autonomous machines. Moreover, apart from the machines’ 
ability to “function in an ethically responsible manner”, it is important to 
know whether they are going to be accepted and trusted as such autonomous 
agents, and what will make them more trustworthy in the eyes of society. The 
problem of interest is how to make technically functional moral machines 
to also be socially functional agents. In other words, Artificial Morality 
also deals with the issue of what characteristics, besides the basic governing 
principles of moral behaviour, the machines need in order to be more like 
human agents. The public opinion about the safety of modern technologies, 
2 This type of classification cannot be found in the available body of literature, but is a 
synthesis of our own examination of the field and corresponding extraction of general 
questions and noteworthy ongoing lines of research.
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in this case, moral machines, is an important aspect of making their usage 
possible. For that reason, the acceptance of machines as integral parts of 
society is one of the central themes in Artificial Morality. This problem is 
probably best verbalized as a question of “what is needed for machines to be 
perceived as moral?”.
Lastly, the third part will deal with the technical side of moral 
engineering. It is necessary to decide the way in which these machines will 
run, that is, what the best approach for implementing moral algorithms 
is and what kinds of algorithms should be implemented in the first place. 
Engineers, in cooperation with psychologists and philosophers, are trying to 
decide which governing ethical principles or machine learning algorithms 
will give optimal results in real-life conditions and render correct ethical 
judgements. Moreover, the choice on a conceptual level of a machine’s 
functioning (whether there is going to be a set of basic principles which 
govern machine behaviour, or if the machine will be able to learn and extract 
ethical principles from experience and then use them to guide its own moral 
judgements) implies a specific programming approach, which, then, has its 
own technical challenges.
Artificial intelligence has been a growing field of work for the past 50 
years (Malle, 2015, pp 161), and yet efforts to answer certain questions about 
morally functioning autonomous AI machines, or artificial moral agents 
(hereinafter AMAs), had begun only a decade ago (Yampolskiy, 2013, pp 389). 
A key reason for even stepping into this endeavour of creating AMAs was the 
rapid development of autonomous machines or decision-making algorithms 
used in a wide range of everyday situations, from driverless vehicles and elder 
care robots, to bank intelligent money transfer software (Wallach & Allen, 
2009, pp 17; Goodall, 2014, pp 93, Misselhorn, 2018, pp 162).
Consequently, this emerging usage of autonomous systems has increased 
the number of situations in which they will be put in a decision-making role 
with a different magnitude of repercussions for the society. Moreover, there 
are already seemingly paradigmatic examples of the aftermath of judgements 
in morally oblivious AIs. There have been incidents in which these AIs, 
as a result of their reasoning process, selected violent videos for children, 
produced racist tweets or even racially discriminated against convicts on 
parole when accessing their risk for recidivism (Shank, DeSanti & Maninger, 
2019, pp 652). However, there are even more moral decision-making 
opportunities that we encounter daily. Although they are not as visible as 
aforementioned scenarios, and thus not used as representative examples for 
the exigency argument about the implementation of moral decision-making 
abilities in artificial intelligence, they are vastly frequent and, consequently, 
more important. For instance, we can briefly focus on the increase of daily 
usage of automated vehicles and elder care robots. Goodall addresses (2014) 
the remark that people rarely make moral decisions while driving, and thus 
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machines shouldn’t either, by accentuating the morality of everyday decisions, 
regardless of how small they may seem (especially when an evaluation about 
their importance is made based on actualized consequences rather than 
possibilities). Accordingly, he states that the category of ethical judgements 
includes cases such as a driver deciding whether to unlawfully speed up so 
there can be more room for a cyclist on the road (Goodall, 2014, pp 97). 
Similarly, Wallach and Allen mention the example of medication dispensing 
robots for the elderly (Wallach & Allen, 2009, pp 15). In its way of completing 
the task of handing medicine to someone in need, a robot may encounter 
various obstacles that require ethical judgement about the robot’s further 
behaviour. What if the mentioned obstacle is a child instead of an object? 
Would the robot’s judgement be based on the utility of alternative solutions? 
Should the robot have a predefined set of preferable actions and rules it 
follows, or should it be able to learn from experience and examples of correct 
judgements in order to abstract guiding rules?
There is a shared concern about the possible outcomes of self-guided 
behaviour in morally oblivious machines (Anderson & Anderson, 2007, pp 
16; Goodall, 2014, pp 94; Misselhorn, 2018, pp 162; Yampolskiy, 2013, pp 389; 
Shank, DeSanti & Maninger, 2019, pp 649; Wallach & Allen, 2009, pp 3), but 
also a research field that aims to overcome these concerns. This field is called 
Artificial Morality. Its central approach to preventing possible judgement 
mistakes of intelligent machines is ensuring that their behaviour towards 
humans and the environment is ethically acceptable, which is achieved by 
creating artificial moral agents, AMAs.
2. Modality of AMAs: moral agency of machines
One of the main problems in Artificial Morality is whether machines 
can be moral agents in the same way that humans are, or at least moral 
enough to be attributed the characteristic of moral agency. Following the 
latter thought, there is a discouraging picture of AI’s morality in relation to 
human morality. The public opinion of AIs is more negative than positive, 
that is, people are distrustful towards intelligent machines and they do not 
feel at ease about machines making autonomous decisions. In other words, 
people do not perceive AIs as moral agents, nor do they attribute to them 
the status of equal members of the society (Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2014, pp 
318). From such state arises a new problem of inequality amongst humans 
and AIs. Dispositions that can be formularized and implemented in artificial, 
intelligent machines, which can then simulate them successfully, often get 
post hoc characterized as not real enough, or even completely disregarded, 
because of the idea of non-human embodiment (Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 
2014, pp 318). Bostrom states (2014) that this kind of rejection of valuable 
human characteristics, when they are exhibited by machines, emerges from 
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the recognition of their specialization in a specific domain. For example, 
AI’s ability to play chess or Go better than the champions in these games 
ceases to be perceived as extraordinary, impressive or valuable because of the 
awareness that this ability in AI is limited only to this domain (Bostrom & 
Yudkowsky, 2014, pp 318). This devaluation of human abilities which are not 
proven as general traits, but instead exist only for a specific purpose, indicates 
that value is attributed to those characteristics that are applicable in a variety 
of situations.
In addition to the demand for generalizability of traits, so they can be 
accepted as human-like, there is also a demand for a less perfect performance 
(Indurkhya, 2019, pp 108). Perfection and lack of mistakes in a machine’s 
performance of tasks evokes a sense of mannerism and artificiality in humans. 
Because of the social rejection of AIs manifestation of human dispositions, 
the efforts for creating widely accepted machines are going in the direction 
of making their behaviour more human-like. For example, there have been 
cases of deliberately constructing AIs that make mistakes while performing 
specific actions such as dancing or drawing (Indurkhya, 2019, pp 109). This 
issue of public acceptance and required competence for equal and human-
like machines will be addressed in the section Moral competence of machines. 
This section will focus on the conditions of moral agency.
There is no universally accepted definition of moral agency in ethics 
literature. Furthermore, there are frequent disagreements over what 
constitutes a moral agent (Misselhorn, 2018, pp 163), but despite this division 
of opinion, there is also a surprising overlap in different understandings of 
moral status (Misselhorn, 2018, pp 163).
One of these understandings (Misselhorn, 2018, pp 163) highlights two 
central conditions of moral agency: (1) the subject must be an agent, (2) and 
it must be a moral agent.
Agency is then defined through concepts of self-origination and self-
reasoning. The concept of self-origination refers to the origin of an agent’s 
action. The agent is here understood as self-originating only if the source 
of her action is within herself. That means that the action initiators are the 
internal structure and dispositions of the subject and not external events. The 
most demanding form of the self-origination concept refers to “the action 
without any prior cause” except the agent’s humour, but a less strict and 
commonly used form of self-origination is understood as actions that are 
under the control of the agent, are not solely determined by external stimuli 
and can be manifested with “greater flexibility that is dependent on the agent” 
(Misselhorn, 2018, pp 163). In a practical sense, applicable to artificial agents, 
less demanding criteria of self-origination means that agents are able to 
interact with the environment, to affect the environment and its own state 
without the influence of external events, adapt to external conditions or 
actively change them. The self-reasoning concept considers the capacity to 
32 Marija Kušić, Petar Nurkić
act for a reason, in other words, the capacity to have a belief in something 
and a pro-attitude (desire) towards something. The combination of belief and 
pro-attitude constitutes a reason to act and guide our behaviour.
Furthermore, moral agency is attributed to the agent if her source of 
action, and reasons for it, come from inner moral reasons. That is, the agent 
can be a moral agent only if her self-origination and self-reasoning capacities 
include moral attributes (Misselhorn, 2018, pp 164).
A similar understanding of moral status (Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 
2014, pp 321) also extracts two important criteria: sentience and sapience 
of the agent. Sentience applies to the ability to have qualia, an idiosyncratic 
phenomenological experience. Qualia is often understood through the capacity 
to feel pain, but it refers to any kind of emotional or sensory experience. 
Moreover, it is thought that animals possess, in different degrees, this ability 
of phenomenological experience. The concept of sapience is understood as 
a capacity for self-awareness (consciousness) and acting for a reason. This 
kind of capacity implies higher cognitive structure which can only be found 
in humans. It can be noticed that sapience incorporates both Misselhorn’s 
conditions of agency (self-origination and self-reasoning) but does not imply 
moral reasons that she highlights as necessary for moral agency.
It is clear that artificial systems cannot meet the most demanding forms of 
aforementioned conditions of moral agency, but given that such metaphysical 
concepts evoke still unresolved debates concerning human agents, there is a 
justified reason to concentrate on less demanding criteria of moral agency. 
In the case of the self-originating concept, we should move away from 
the metaphysical controversy of determinism and initiation without any 
prior cause. Less demanding criteria understand self-originating agents as 
agents who can change their environment or their own state without being 
influenced by external stimuli (Misselhorn, 2018, pp 163). This criterion puts 
focus on observable elements of situations that guide our conception and 
attribution of agency. We argue that this form of conclusion about the agency 
is a justified way of judging about the moral status of machines, given that it 
appears to be an important aspect of judging about agency when it comes to 
humans.
When attributing the cause for someone’s behaviour, people primarily 
take into account the situational factors of the event (Kelley & Michela, 
1980). Whether the cause of someone’s action is going to be attributed to 
their internal dispositions or to external situational factors, depends on the 
observable characteristics of a situation. According to the empirically sustained 
Kelly’s Attribution theory, if there is a possible situational explanation for 
someone’s action, the cause of action will be attributed to the external stimuli 
rather than person’s dispositions (Kelley, 1973; Kelley & Michela, 1980). For 
example, we do not interpret a professor delivering a lecture as her being a 
talkative person nor do we interpret a waiter’s pleasantness as him being a 
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friendly person. Instead, we exhibit a tendency to explain their behaviour as 
situationally structured – the professor talks because it is her job to give a 
lecture, and the waiter is pleasant because his job also depends on his positive 
attitude. In lack of congruent situational factors, the cause of action will be 
attributed to inner factors, a person’s dispositions (Kelley & Michela, 1980). 
That means that, for example, we will interpret the waiter’s unpleasantness as 
him being a rude person because there are no relevant, congruent external 
factors that can overrule attribution to inner, dispositional factors.
The same framework can be applied to the general attribution of agency. 
If such regularity of attribution of dispositions is noticed when it comes to 
human actions, then the same logical line should be justifiably followed by a 
discussion about the machine’s actions. Bostrom’s principle of ontogeny non-
discrimination (Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2014, pp 323) also states that “if two 
beings have the same functionality and the same consciousness experience, 
and differ only in how they came to existence, then they have the same moral 
status”. That means that if artificial systems can act without any situational 
factors that noticeably influence their actions, they can be attributed with 
dispositional causes. These inner causes are markers of agency, and if AI 
systems have the capacity to act according to inner causes and reasons, they 
will have some status of agency. Additionally, if those reasons are moral 
reasons, they will have the status of moral agency (Misselhorn, 2018, pp 164).
An interesting view of agency, applicable to AI systems, is provided 
within the framework of moral psychology. Gray and colleagues (Gray, 
Young & Waytz, 2012, pp 103) discuss moral agency (i.e. moral judgement) 
as fundamentally dependent on, and determined by, mind perception. On 
the basis of extensive research of mind perception, they conclude that people 
perceive minds through two independent dimensions – the dimension 
of experience and the dimension of agency. The experience dimension is 
analog to Bostrom’s concept of sentience, and is understood as the ability for 
sensation and feelings, while the agency dimension, which can be represented 
by the concept of sapience, refers to the capacity to act and to intend (Gray, 
Young & Waytz, 2012, pp 103). These dimensions of mind perception appear 
to be strongly linked with perception of one’s moral status, usually defined 
through ascriptions of rights and responsibility. Perception of experience 
is correlated with ascription of rights, that is, with the perceived ability to 
feel (pain, pleasantness) comes the ability to benefit or suffer. Perception 
of agency, on the other hand, is correlated with ascription of responsibility, 
namely, if one is prescribed a higher capacity to act and intend, one could 
also be attributed more blame or praise (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012, pp 104).
As Gray and colleagues define it, perception of agency qualifies moral 
agents and perception of experience qualifies moral patients (Gray, Young & 
Waytz, 2012, pp 104). As agency and experience (or moral agency and moral 
patiency) are independent dimensions, there can be entities high in both 
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dimensions, low in both dimensions, or high in one and low in the other 
dimension. For instance, adults are perceived as entities that are high in both 
agency and patiency, and thus can be both responsible (blamed) for their 
actions and deserve rights (protection) from actions of others. Moreover, AI 
systems would be perceived as high in agency, which would grant them the 
status of moral agents, but low in experience, which would deny them the 
status of moral patients. Essentially, that means that AI systems will always 
be perceived as entities who act but never receive (feel). Given the omission 
of perceived capacity for sensation, AIs will not have moral rights, but, given 
the actualized perception of agency, they will be ascribed to full spectrum of 
moral responsibility
Moreover, morality is broadly understood as a dyadic interaction between 
two perceived minds, a moral agent and a moral patient. Gray and colleagues 
argue that the essence of morality can be captured in this cognitive template 
of “perceived intentional moral agent and a suffering moral patient”, where 
the presence of moral agent is required but the presence of suffering moral 
patient can just be imagined (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012, pp 107).
A dyadic structure of morality recognizes the phenomena of moral 
typecasting. Moral typecasting refers to the categorization of people either as 
moral agents or moral patients. Even though this kind of mutually exclusive 
categorization is apparent within a specific moral context (where a prototypical 
moral situation revolves around the interaction of a moral agent and a moral 
patient), moral typecasting suggests a more general categorization – people 
are usually and consistently seen as either moral agents or moral patients 
(Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012, pp 113).
Furthermore, moral typecasting can influence the perception of one’s 
mind, that is, the perception of one’s moral status. Those that are categorized 
as moral agents are ascribed with the capacity for agency and intention, and 
are given moral responsibility as well, whereas those categorized as moral 
patients are ascribed with the capacity for experience and are given moral 
rights (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012, pp 113). Given that AIs will consistently 
be found in roles of moral agents, as acting entities with aims and tasks, 
they will automatically be categorized as moral agents and correspondingly 
attributed with agency and intention.
Concluding this section, we can see that AIs, by the very fact of fulfilling 
the roles of agents, can be (and will be) perceived as moral agents with a 
certain level of expected moral responsibility. However, a natural consequence 
of typecasting AIs as moral agents will create a general, conclusive perception 
of them only as moral agents, but never moral patients. This puts AIs in 
an unflattering position. Although they can have moral agency and can be 
blamed for their actions, they cannot enjoy the status of being moral patients 
similar to humans or animals, and will thus not be given corresponding 
moral rights.
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3. Moral competence of machines
The discussion about machine morality has so far been focused on their 
capacity to be moral agents and the problems of defining moral agency. 
With those tasks ahead come many difficulties about finding one universally 
accepted definition of moral agency and choosing which of the many 
understandings of moral agency to follow when deciding about the machine’s 
moral status. Malle, however, proposes a new approach to the problem 
(Malle, 2015, pp 245): it is more functional to focus on the constituents of 
human moral competence and use them as orientation guides for creating 
morally competent machines, instead of focusing on defining moral agency. 
Understanding the elements of human moral competence can serve as a 
guide for the making of moral algorithms for machines. This approach ends 
discussions about machines as moral agents equivalent to humans, and 
makes room for more fruitful possibilities for designing machines that are 
competent agents which can perform the needed tasks. They can also have 
different degrees of competence.
If machines adequately exhibit this moral competence, people can decide 
on whether they are willing to accept and form social relationships with the 
machines. Malle’s approach of observation of human behaviour as a guideline 
for designing machines emphasize the relevance of human-like abilities in 
AIs. Other authors emphasize this approach as a relevant and successful way 
for accelerating AIs social acceptance as well (Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2014, 
pp 317; Malle, 2015, pp 253; Malhotra, Kotwal, Dalal, 2018, pp 4; Indurkhya, 
2019, pp 110).
3.1. Human-like competence in machines
Moral competence is an aptitude to successfully perform moral tasks, 
namely, tasks of moral decision making and moral behaviour (Malle, 2015, pp 
255). Furthermore, moral tasks imply the capability of moral cognition that 
is defined through one’s aptitude for judgements of blame and permissibility, 
recognition of right and wrong, and emotional reactions while performing 
these moral tasks (Malle, 2015, pp 255). Acceptance of AIs as moral and 
social agents depends on their ability to meet people’s expectations about 
their moral and social responsibility. The initial idea is that, with performing 
regular human tasks, AIs will also take on regular human responsibilities. 
Their capacity to satisfy these expectations, and successfully perform moral 
tasks, determines in what degree they are perceived as equal members of 
society (Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2014, pp 316; Malle, 2015, pp 245).
Central elements of human moral competence, according to Malle, are 
(1) moral vocabulary, (2) a system of norms, (3) moral cognition and affect, 
(4) moral decision making and action, (5) and moral communication (Malle, 
2015, pp 245). An extensive study of these elements can be found in Malle, 
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2015, but the highlighting of the importance for machines to demonstrate 
more human-like characteristics, in order to make them optimal social 
agents, puts focus on the emotional aspect of human functioning, that is, on 
the needed emotional aspect of machine functioning.
Moral philosophy and moral psychology dominantly concentrated their 
research of morality around the study of moral reasoning, thus neglecting 
moral emotions, up until the 1990s. This leadership of cognitive reasoning 
in understanding morality was a product of cognitive revolution and the idea 
that morality, like language, can be expressed through underlying cognitive 
structures and corresponding transformations (Haidt, 2003, pp 852). Later 
theories, on the other hand, highlighted the role of emotions, but the most 
realistic approach to this problem is the comprehension of both moral 
cognition and moral emotions as backbones of human morality.
The capacity for both moral cognition and moral emotions that humans 
exhibit lacks in the case of AIs. As discussed in the previous section, machines 
can be understood as moral agents with an expected moral responsibility, but 
never as moral patients with related moral rights. AIs are presumably denied 
moral patiency because they are missing the capacity for qualia. This capacity, 
besides sensory experiences such as pain, incorporates an emotional life of an 
entity, that is, a potential for emotional experience. Emotions, or emotional 
experiences, are reactions to inter– and intra-activity of an organism, with 
the main function of mobilizing that organism to adaptively deal with such 
encounters (Ekman, 1999, pp 46). In other words, emotions are mainly 
responses to threatening and beneficial stimuli with great motivational 
tendency, attendant facial expressions and phenomenological experience 
(Haidt, 2003, 854).
The difference between emotions and moral emotions lies in their 
relation to self (Haidt, 2003, pp 853). According to Haidt, moral emotions 
are those emotions that are not directed to self but are “linked to the interests 
or welfare of other people or a society as a whole”, whereas other non-moral 
emotions are always in more direct relation to self and occur as a reaction to 
influences on the agent. AIs are missing both types of emotional experience. 
Emotions such as fear, sadness and happiness are mainly categorized as non-
moral emotions, given their occurrence in situations directly related to the 
agent or in situations of less direct relation between the self and the other. 
Lack of these emotions deprives AIs of moral rights because not only can 
they not be physically hurt but they are not able to feel emotional pain or 
gain either, and are thus perceived as entities that do not need to be protected 
by society, i.e. do not need moral rights. Moreover, the most prototypical 
moral emotions are elevation, anger, guilt and compassion, as their triggers 
are usually disinterested stimuli and are easily triggered by tragedies and 
transgressions of strangers (Haidt, 2003, pp 854). AI’s inability to feel guilt if it 
makes a judgement error and causes tragedies, or to feel compassion or anger 
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if it encounters tragedy and pain, determines its further behaviour. Given that 
emotions have strong action tendencies and motivate some kind of response 
to the eliciting stimuli, AI’s emotional oblivion restricts its empathic and 
helping actions. That influences the social perception of machines’ “coldness” 
and elicits anticipation of their reluctance to help, which again accelerates 
people’s distrust in machines and makes their social acceptance difficult.
Even though machines can be implemented with algorithms of moral 
acting, and can thus help others and intervene in situations of need, they are 
still perceived as agents that cannot feel the direct consequences of moral 
behaviour related to them. Such picture of senseless entities restricts the 
attribution of moral patiency and makes them humanly distant.
There are, however, other traits that will help AIs to be socially accepted. 
Bostrom adds several criteria that need to be algorithmically formalized and 
implemented in machines (Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2014, pp 317). The central 
one, to which others may be reduced, is transparency in decision making. 
The transparency of AIs reasoning process enables its inspection, a matter 
of significant importance in the possible scenarios of reasoning mistakes or 
hazards caused by AIs decisions (Bostrom & Yudkowsky, 2014, pp 317). The 
knowledge of how these intelligent algorithms make their decisions does not 
only enable the tracking of responsibility (and blame) of machines but also 
has the purpose of amplifying their social trustworthiness. This openness to 
investigation removes their “black box” artificial invisibility and excites their 
similarity to human behaviour. Therefore, it is more than needed to equip AIs 
with psychologically relevant explanations of their own processes (Indurkhya, 
2019, pp 110).
Being equipped with psychologically compelling explanations, such as 
transparency of processes, may also excite AIs general similarity to human 
behaviour and their consequential acceptance. Until the wanted level of 
technical development is reached, and AIs are endowed with senses, further 
development of machines needs to progress in the direction of psychological 
openness of their judging processes.
3.2. Responsible AIs
An individual’s involvement in society is in social psychology often 
discussed from the perspective of interactionism. The same perspective can 
be applied to machines, given the effort put into making them welcome 
members of society that have the status of moral agents. Interactionism 
describes identity as a meaning derived from social roles one occupies 
(Burke & Tully, 1977, pp 883). Social surrounding reacts to the agent with 
expectations for the agent’s behaviour to correspond with her social role, in 
other words, social surrounding reacts as if the agent’s identity is appropriate 
to her role performance. An agent understands that reaction and forms a 
meaning about her identity that guides her following behaviour (Burke & 
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Tully, 1977, pp 883). In the case of AI systems, it is important to highlight 
that these social expectations are derived from the very fact that someone is a 
social agent (Stouten, DeCremer & Van Dijk, 2006, pp 894).
When AI occupies a certain social role, it will evoke corresponding 
social expectations about its behaviour and dispositions that are common in 
humans (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012, pp 113). AI systems, in this case, need 
to prove their identity of moral agents by adequately dealing with expected 
moral tasks. Moral competence, besides moral judgement and emotions, 
entails conforming to social norms such as the principles of righteousness and 
equality. If social expectations of honouring these principles are disappointed, 
people will react with anger, emotional distress and retributive reactions in 
order to correct the inflicted injustice (Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 
1982, pp 384; Stouten, DeCremer & Van Dijk, 2006, pp 895). Because these 
reactions only appear when someone is perceived as a moral agent, that is, 
if someone is perceived responsible for their actions and obliged to follow 
social norms (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012, pp 113), we can test the moral 
status of AIs by examining people’s reactions to AIs in situations following 
the violation of social norms.
There has been a new body of experimental literature that grips the above-
mentioned problems of AIs’ social acceptance. One of the ways to investigate 
their social status, or at least to scratch the surface of social interaction 
between humans and machines, is through the Game Theory experiments. 
These experiments simulate decision-making interactions between players 
with an aim to reveal and understand the components of their reactions and 
reasoning (Osburne, 2004, pp 1). Simulated situations of choice often require 
social choices where subjects can demonstrate their social norms compliance 
or violation, and reaction to the compliance or violation of others. That is, 
they can demonstrate their moral competency.
Relevant for these purposes is the bargaining game, called the Ultimatum 
Game. The simplest and most commonly used version of the Ultimatum Game 
is the two-player version. This is a bargaining game because one of the players 
must solve a distribution problem, usually of goods (Guth, Schmittberger & 
Schwarze, 1982, pp 367). When this player (commonly known as the first 
player) makes her choice of distribution, she restricts all the possible alternatives 
of distribution of goods to one proposal (her choice). The other player (the 
second player) can then only accept or refuse the first player’s proposal. In other 
words, the first player decides on how to distribute the goods (e.g. money) and 
makes her proposal to the second player who can then only accept or decline. 
There are no simultaneous moves of players in the Ultimatum Game, but 
instead, every aspect of the game is successive so that the players can always 
observe each other’s decisions (Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982, pp 367; 
Osburne, 2004, pp 179). That way, every player is, at the same time, always and 
completely informed of every previous move in the game3.
3 Such a game is said to have perfect information.
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The specificity of the Ultimatum Game is that the bargaining comes 
in a form of “strategic reactions based on anticipated future events” (Guth, 
Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982, pp 368) where the first player takes into 
account the “fairness” of her proposal to the second player, and the second 
player takes into account that the alternative option to the first player’s 
proposal, however unbeneficial, is nothing (and is always worse than the 
proposed distribution). Because of this bargaining aspect, the game is suitable 
for investigating social norms and moral behaviour. A further variation of 
the game can be found in the Dictator’s Game with perfect information. 
The Dictator’s Game has only one move in which the first player makes a 
proposal, and the second player has no other option but to accept it.
The question of interest, when it comes to the social status of machines, 
is whether they will get the same treatment as human players. Given that 
both the Ultimatum and the Dictator’s games are widely used in social 
interaction researches, there are noticed regularities of choices that people 
make and emotional reactions to those choices. If these regularities of human 
behaviour towards each other also manifest in the games with human and 
machine players, that is, if human players treat machines the same as they 
treat humans, there can be a more optimistic comprehension of the machines’ 
social status.
One of the robust findings are acts of retribution when one player 
feels that norms have been deliberately violated by the other player (Guth, 
Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982, pp 384; Stouten, DeCremer & Van Dijk, 
2006, pp 895). In situations where the first player’s proposal exceeds the 70:30 
proportion of distributed goods in her favour, the second player would usually 
decline the offer even though it means that she will end up without anything. 
This kind of reaction is described as a retributive reaction to what someone 
understands as injustice (Stouten, DeCremer & Van Dijk, 2006, pp 895). 
There is also an observed regularity of the prosocial proposals first players 
commonly make. In most cases their distributions are fairly made, that is, the 
majority of players distribute goods in an approximately equal share. More 
specifically, they strive to benefit from their distribution, but to also split the 
goods according to the fairness norm (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin & Sefton, 
1994, pp 362, Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982, pp 384).
Equivalent treatment of machines and humans was demonstrated in one 
such experiment (Nagataki et al., 2019). No significant difference was found 
between human and robot status in prosocial and retributive tendencies of 
participants. All human participants made the same prosocial offer of nearly 
half of the total amount of money to robots as they did to humans, in both, 
the Ultimatum and the Dictator’s Game. That way, they equally respected the 
norm of fairness amongst social agents, whether the other agent was human 
or not. Moreover, the participants rejected “unfair” offers from robots, just 
as they did from humans, thus demonstrating a will to punish what they 
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considered unjust behaviour, even at the cost of their own gain. These kinds 
of equivalent reactions to machines and humans may speak in favour of 
potentially equal social status between them.
4. Engineering approaches to machine morality
Because the consequences of AIs decisions have an unavoidable impact 
on humans they need to be treated at least as agents with moral behaviour, 
regardless of the society’s acceptance and the question of their full moral 
agency (Allen, Smith & Wallach, 2005, pp 149). The very idea behind 
artificial moral agents (AMAs) is to implement human-like characteristics 
and learning abilities in them so that they can regulate and monitor their 
own behaviour, correct themselves and perform better in the future decision-
making situations (Wallach & Allen, 2009, pp 15). This is the intersection of 
work paths of engineers, philosophers, and moral psychologists.
Top-down and bottom-up approaches are two traditional engineering 
approaches that dictate how different moral principles can be used and 
algorithmically formalized with the goal of creating AMAs. The third, hybrid 
approach emerges as a combination of the former two and is insofar the most 
promising one (Wallach, Allen & Smith, 2007, pp 575: Misselhorn, 2018, pp 166).
4.1. Top-down systems
Top-down approaches are based on fixed normative principles, 
implemented in AMAs, which are then used as guiding rules of the machine’s 
behaviour. Often called a “rule-based” approach (Allen, Smith & Wallach, 
2005, pp 150), top-down models require a general set of moral principles that 
need to be selected. These principles are then universally obeyed in every 
situation of moral dilemma and expressed throughout the machine’s actions.
One of the first problems with these systems is the selection of moral 
principles to begin with. There can be an unlimited set of contents from 
which these main principles can be selected (Allen, Smith & Wallach, 2005, 
pp 150). Most commonly used moral norms are derived from great ethical 
theories such as Kantian deontology and utilitarianism, but other frequently 
named principles are Asimov’s laws of robotics, The Ten Commandments or 
the Torah Commandments (Goodall, 2014, pp 98; Allen, Smith & Wallach, 
2005, pp 150; Misselhorn, 2018, pp 166; Yamapolskiy, 2013, pp 389). As it can 
be seen, these principles can vary dramatically in their generality and number, 
from three general and unspecified principles in the case of Asimov’s laws to 
the complex computational system needed when it comes to utilitarianism.
Because of their generality, lack of applicability to more domain-specific 
contexts, and inability to define a concrete set of principles or actions which 
will guide one’s decisions across different contexts and situations, top-down 
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approaches are severely criticized (Allen, Smith & Wallach, 2005, pp 150). 
The challenge lies in finding an optimal way of deriving a set of specific rules 
from the abstract principles. Even though their number is fixed, these rules 
should be usable in a variety of specific situations.
This approach predominantly uses consequentialist and Kantian theories 
as starting points in deriving guiding principles for AMAs. Both theories 
have their own specific problems, but also have a shared one (Allen, Smith & 
Wallach, 2005, pp 151). The top-down approach based on Kantian deontology 
encounters the problem of hierarchy of principles, that is, how to submit all its 
specific principles to one highest principle without contradiction. The other 
main problem concerns the availability of information, more closely, how 
AMA should know about the intentions and motives of every agent included 
in some decision-making situation. Utilitarian AMA faces problems of finding 
a common value scale for measuring different utilities in various situations 
and of enormous computational resources needed for even evaluating possible 
outcomes for every event (Allen, Smith & Wallach, 2005, pp 151). Their 
shared problem, and a reason for the abandonment of the top-down approach, 
is the unlikeliness that these algorithms could ever collect and compare every 
information that they need. This is even more transparent in the cases of 
consideration of future consequences of actions, instead of focusing on direct 
and present consequences (Allen, Smith & Wallach, 2005, pp 151).
4.2. Bottom-up systems
The question that imposes itself is how humans restrict their own 
calculation of continuous external stimuli and predict future consequences 
since this problem of computational and informational overload is present in 
the case of their cognitive system as well. Human behaviour is often guided 
by heuristics and affects decision making (Allen, Smith & Wallach, 2005, pp 
151). Moreover, we have the ability to learn from experience and observation. 
That leads to creating cognitive schemes (scenarios) of plausible events that 
guide our behaviour when we end up in similar situations (Greene, 2017, pp 
69) and, in most cases of decision making, it is what we rely on.
Bottom-up models are based on the abovementioned history of learning, 
more closely on real data, the experience of correct judgements in decision-
making situations from which AMA abstracts moral principles and controls 
its acts. Bottom-up AMAs do not need an initial set of guiding principles. That 
means that AMA learns proper moral behaviour while actively participating 
in their environment (Allen, Smith & Wallach, 2005, pp 151). Bottom-up 
AMAs can be realized throughout different initial settings and algorithms 
that determine the type of their learning process. They can simulate learning 
through trial and error attempts, they can be based on educational learning 
processes and simulate socialization and the growth of a child, they can 
simulate evolutionary processes of cognitive and moral growth of an agent, 
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or they can be based on neural-network processes which associate patterns in 
the surroundings they encounter (Misselhorn, 2018, pp 166; Wallach, Allen 
& Smith, 2007, pp 570).
This approach resolves some of the problems that top-down models have 
by introducing a self-changing and self-improving system. The machines 
based on Bayesian models can adopt moral rules and change their behaviour 
when in contact with their social surroundings. They constantly revaluate 
first guiding principles, as a reaction to new information and experience 
learning, and verify the consistency of all previously formed rules (Shaw, 
Stockel, Orr, Lidbetter & Cohen, 2018, pp 73). These machines become self-
checking agents capable of human-like adaptation to surroundings.
Bottom-up systems provide more natural and stronger models of moral 
reasoning that can be an almost ideal approach for creating agents with 
optimal social functioning and ethically responsible judgements. However, 
a significant problem of these systems is that they are extremely difficult 
to develop and usually need a lot of time to evolve into an optimal moral-
reasoning autonomous agent (Allen, Smith & Wallach, 2005, pp 151). There 
is a rising problem of controlling the learning data for AMAs, so cases in 
which bad data may contribute to their socially unacceptable principles and 
decisions can be avoided. Other than that, engineers encounter an additional 
problem of not knowing which principles to use as a guideline in the 
situations of changed contexts (Wallach, Allen & Smith, 2007, pp 572) and 
the uncertainty of what will be the evolutionary outcome of a specific AMA 
(Misselhorn, 2018, pp 167).
4.3. Hybrid systems
Although top-down and bottom-up models represent the most common 
way of implementation of moral competence in AMAs, their combination 
is often characterized as necessary for overcoming the specific and general 
problems that both approaches carry (Misselhorn, 2018, pp 166). Therefore, 
hybrid systems originate from combining top-down and bottom-up 
approaches into one “eclectic” model. Hybrid AMAs are implemented with 
algorithms inspired by both traditional approaches.
Their top-down part is a predefined and fixed set of initial principles 
that serves as a starting point from which AMAs learn and self-improve. 
The predefined sets of rules are often not as general as in traditional top-
down systems, but are more closely specified to domains in which they are 
set to be used (Misselhorn, 2018, pp 167). As it was mentioned, hybrid AMAs 
maintain the ability of self-improvement regardless of their initial moral 
principles. This ability to learn from experience and adapt is their bottom-up 
part (Allen, Smith, Wallach, 2005, pp 153), and because of that, their guiding 
principles often get changed throughout this learning process. Hybrid AMAs, 
as self-checking agents that are actively involved in the environment, develop 
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even more specific moral judgements congruent to characteristics of their 
surroundings (Misselhorn, 2018, 166).
Allen, Wallach and Smith (2005) interpret top-down and bottom-up 
systems through contrasting the explicit and implicit values and their ways 
of acquiring. In their description, top-down systems can be understood as 
explicit values and ethical principles “outside of the entity” that are demanded 
from a specific cultural milieu, while bottom-up systems are implicit moral 
values abstracted from practice and experience that then emerge from 
“within the entity” (Allen, Smith, Wallach, 2005, pp 153). That way, a top-
down AMA can be described as AMA of “rights and duties” or “welfare 
and utility”, while bottom-up AMA is an AMA of “practice and experience”. 
As their combination, hybrid AMA is understood as an entity raised in a 
culture which prescribes its own explicit moral concerns and judgements and 
requires they be respected, while it (the AMA) still has constant opportunity 
to discover and learn other values and traits from practice (Wallach, Allen & 
Smith, 2007, pp 576). That is, AMA is given some kind of parental rules (like 
those a child is demanded to follow during his or her development) but it 
also interacts with the environment and through that learns or demonstrates 
her individual traits.
Because of the above-described hybrid AMA’s position between top-
down and bottom-up models, Aristotelian virtue ethics is seen as a fruitful 
framework for hybrid algorithms (Wallach, Allen & Smith, 2007, pp 576). 
Aristotelian virtuous character resembles ethical principles and initial 
rules implemented in hybrid AMA because, in both cases, they are initial 
motivators of one’s action and overall behaviour, and are understood as one’s 
features or traits. Furthermore, Aristotelian understanding that moral virtues 
are learned through experience, and consolidated from constant practice, is 
equivalent to hybrid AMA’s ability to learn from experience and self-improve 
(Wallach, Allen & Smith, 2007, pp 576).
Hybrid AMA begins to be interpreted as an individual, into which 
one can instill Aristotelian “good traits”, virtues or characteristics, “complex 
patterns of motivation” (Wallach, Allen & Smith, 2007, pp 577) and 
personality dispositions that determine our tendencies to act in a certain way. 
This new line of thinking has the reincarnated problems of top-down models. 
It is difficult to choose a number and type of virtues machines should have in 
order to be moral, but importantly, it is extremely difficult to simulate virtues 
(Wallach, Allen & Smith, 2007, pp 577). Virtues, as dispositions and patterns 
of motivation, are manifested in one’s general way of behaving, i.e. in a variety 
of different situations. In that sense, one virtue has multiple behavioural 
expressions and is responsible for various acts. Because of that, AMAs should 
be able to connect every potential action or judgement to a certain trait, that 
is, they should be able to “know “every possible manifestation of some virtue 
so it could adequately practice that virtue in its overall behaviour. Moreover, 
the traditional problem of constant checking if every chosen action is 
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congruent with all guiding principles, both specific and higher, requires 
enormous computational power. Even more computer power is needed for 
creating a non-contradictory hierarchy of virtues and enabling a changeable 
AMA to develop and incorporate new virtues in such a non-contradictory 
way (Wallach, Allen & Smith, 2007, pp 577).
Another approach of implementing Aristotelian virtues in AMAs 
comes from bottom-up models, specifically, neural networks. The central 
idea is the development of a virtuous character. Neural network system has 
access to training data from which it abstracts moral principles, while the 
further gathering of data is realized in real-life scenarios where network 
surpasses its previous generalized principles (Wallach, Allen & Smith, 2007, 
pp 577). However, present perspectives that provide insights into human 
developmental process still cannot provide adequate frameworks for the 
learning process of moral virtues when it comes to neural networks (Wallach, 
Allen & Smith, 2007, pp 578), and for now, this approach remains only a 
daring idea.
4.3.1. Culturally assimilated AMAs
Allan et al. (2005) discuss the initial set of guiding principles in hybrid 
AMAs as explicit values of the cultural milieu they are made for. However, 
this thought is not just a superficial analogy made for better conceptual 
understanding of the top-down approach. Cultural variation requires the 
adaptation of machines to specific contexts in which they function. For this 
to be done, we need to first abstract specific dimensions of morality, and 
from there conclude which specific dimensions suit which culture.
The Moral Foundation Theory (MFT) provides a conclusive picture 
of a moral mind “constructed” of a universal set of moral modules, innate 
foundations which guide the learning process of moral values, norms and 
rules, and are environmentally sensitive (Graham et al., 2013, pp 10). Haidt 
and colleges integrate the evolutionary position of innate morality and a 
constructivist perspective on cultural shaping of values and moral behaviour. 
They propose that the human moral mind is organized “in advance of 
experience”, that is, it evolved a set of “moral matrices” (shared knowledge) 
as a tool for solving social problems of a cultural human (Graham et al., 
2013, pp 8). These modules are understood as foundational moral instincts 
that enable the learning of some moral values and behaviours over the other. 
That way, people are innate with potential for acquiring a set of universal 
moral norms (foundations). Which of these universal norms will be adopted, 
which particular values generated and in what degree, will be determined by 
a specific culture, through one’s development process.
Based on the MFT perspective on moral norms we can further discuss 
which set of initial guiding rules, or moral values, should be implemented in 
AMAs. MFT proposes five moral foundations that we mark as suitable for 
AMAs’ norms (Graham et al., 2013, pp 12).
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(1) The Care/harm foundation represents a functional mechanism that 
enables association of perceived suffering with actions of nurturing, caring 
and protection. This foundation is extremely important for machines with 
highly responsible tasks that revolve around people, such as elderly or 
children care, but also for machines whose judgement decisions may directly 
or indirectly influence one’s life (automated vehicles). The AMA with values 
of caring for– and protecting others will presumably be of equal importance 
across cultures, given that more trustworthy and reliable machines will be 
valued and demanded– regardless of the individual differences between 
individualistic and collectivist cultures.
(2) The Fairness/cheating foundation is responsible for being observant 
to sings of cooperation or cheating amongst others (Graham et al., 2013, pp 
13). It generates specific values such as righteousness, fairness, sensitivity to 
inequality, justice that include retributive behaviour as well as rewarding acts, 
and so on. Dimensions of Care, Fairness and Sanctity (described in the next 
paragraph) turn out to be important categories for evaluation of virtuousness 
in both liberal and conservative groups (Graham et al., 2013, pp 20). Given 
this invariability to conservativism, the value of fairness would be important 
for machines to have in different cultures or social groups they are made 
for. By satisfying social demands for fair judgement, AMAs would prove 
themselves as responsible and trustworthy members of society.
(3) The Sanctity/degradation foundation relates to sensitivity for 
puritanism of body and “soul”, that is, values and motives for which “people 
treat their bodies as temples” (Graham et al., 2013, pp 14). It is, as mentioned 
above, a valuable moral norm for estimation of virtuous character, but it is not 
invariant to cultural context. The sanctity is extremely important in collectivist 
and traditional cultures, where AMAs need to adapt to bigger roles of purity 
and religious concerns in everyday life (Graham et al., 2013, pp 26). That 
requires implementation of religious beliefs congruent to the market culture 
of an AMA. Just as it would be preferred that AMAs exhibit dominantly 
practiced and expressed religious rules, values and norms in Eastern cultures, 
it would be required that AMAs do not exhibit those same values in a secular 
society. Moreover, intragroup differences in cultural variation are robustly 
greater than intergroup differences, that is, these traditional differences are 
greater within cultures than between themselves (Graham et al., 2013, pp 
26). Given regularities such as this, it is better to equip AMAs with values 
of puritanism and religion according to the tasks they will perform. If the 
deciding process of the task requires evaluation of such criteria, then its 
implementation is also needed. These are not just complex tasks, but tasks for 
which optimal solutions involve cultural knowledge. We already mentioned 
the example of medication dispensing robots for the elderly (Wallach & Allen, 
2009, pp 15). In its way of handing the medicine, a robot may encounter 
various obstacles that require judgements about whether they are religious 
objects that need to be carefully avoided or not.
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(4) The Loyalty/betrayal foundation highlights the importance of 
motivational tendencies to exhibit the traits such as agreeableness, fidelity and 
alliance, because of their significance for forming coalitions and preserving 
group cohesion (Graham et al., 2013, pp 13). Compliance to this norm makes 
social functioning, particularly group functioning, possible and thus is an 
inevitable value for AMAs that are privately owned. Even though loyalty 
foundation is more connected to the conservative groups (Graham et al., 2013, 
pp 16), machines need to exhibit alliance tendencies as an acceptance tool.
(5) The Authority/subversion foundation serves as a mechanism for 
navigating one’s behaviour in hierarchical social interactions. It shapes values 
of obedience and deference (Graham et al., 2013, pp 13) that are, again, more 
valuable in conservative groups and collectivist cultures than in liberal and 
more individualistic groups. These values may suit AMAs who have roles of 
carers and are in direct contact with humans.
All five moral foundations interact with the environment and generate 
more specific moral values. These foundations are thought to be universal 
structures of the human moral mind, but their shaping and development 
is vastly dependent on culture. As we can see, less traditional and liberal 
groups generate the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundation in greater 
degree than conservative groups, and more traditional and a conservative 
environment values the authority, loyalty and sanctity foundations more 
than liberal groups (Graham et al., 2013, pp 16). That does not exclude 
some moral norms from certain cultures, but rather priorities values within 
cultures. Creators of AMAs should thus be sensitive to these cultural moral 
priorities when making machines for targeted markets, and MFT provides an 
inclusive and culturally sensitive framework for this kind of deliberation of 
initial guiding values.
5. Conclusion
This paper had the aim of systemizing the complex, even though new 
and yet expanding, field of Artificial Morality. Artificial Morality centres 
around the idea of artificial moral agents (AMAs) which represent self-
checking machines able to change and grow while making moral decisions 
side-by-side with humans. The presented structure of main problems in 
Artificial Morality originated from the authors themselves. These problems, 
even though noticeable research obstacles, have never, to our knowledge, 
been understood as a set of three conceptual problems – philosophical, 
psychological and a technical one.
In the beginning, we had to inspect the question of moral agency and its 
theoretical applicability to machines (a philosophical problem). Hopefully, we 
have given our own insights by proposing a line of thinking about machine 
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agency similar to the understanding of human agency. In accordance with 
the less demanding frame of agency, if artificial systems can act without 
any situational factors that noticeably influence their actions, they can be 
attributed with dispositional causes just as humans do. Moreover, if AIs 
exhibit the capacity to act based on their inner causes, dispositions, they will 
have the agency status. This agency status can be understood as the status of 
moral agents if those inner causes and reasons were moral reasons.
The problem of social perception and acceptance of AMAs (psychological 
problem) has a potentially optimistic solution. It was shown that people react 
to machines in the same way as they do to humans, thus attributing to them 
social status and responsibility for their actions. Given that the empirical 
literature on this subject is still limited, these results should be taken with 
caution, and used more as an implication for further research rather than 
conclusions. While considering the importance of human-like competence 
for acceptance of AMAs, a new line of research has emerged. A great deal of 
effort has been invested in implementing some additional instances such as 
emotions, consciousness, or other human capacities (like the theory of mind 
and symbolic understanding), as it is believed that only these competencies 
can make reliable and fully moral artificial agents. These competencies are 
indispensable parts of AMAs, not only because of their social acceptance 
but for their better functionality (Allen, Smith, Wallach, 2005, pp 153). This 
problem has not been inspected in detail, but its significance for creating 
functional AMAs will determine following research in the field.
In the end, we have given a brief overlook of the current state of technical 
advances, possibilities and restrictions in developing a fully functional AMA 
(technical problem). There are three main approaches to implementation of 
moral capacities in machines: the top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approach. 
The first two approaches are traditional and most commonly used systems 
that are being gradually replaced by their combination, a hybrid model, as 
they provide only partially functional AMAs. However, hybrid systems prove 
to be out of the current theoretical and technical reach. Existing frames of 
learning processes of human moral competence are still incompatible with 
the mode of neural networks which are integral to hybrid and bottom-up 
systems. These inspiring ideas in machine learning, even though challenging 
endeavours, will also determine future efforts in creating AMAs.
We conclude this section with discussion on culturally sensitive hybrid 
AMAs. From the perspective of the Moral Foundation Theory (Graham et 
al., 2013), we suggest five moral norms that should be closely evaluated when 
deciding which initial guiding principles should be implemented in machines. 
Moreover, we draft some guidelines for acknowledging cultural differences 
in the valuation of such moral norms but do not offer final solutions. The 
field of moral psychology, particularly the study of universal moral rules and 
cultural variation in norms and practices, is still in its developing research 
stage, and until we have a clearer picture of human morality there will be a 
limited potential for this kind of extrapolation onto machines.
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